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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JOEL SILL, * 
Respondent and * 
Cross-Petitioner, 
* Case No. 20060106 
v. 
* 
BILL HART d/b/a HART 
CONSTRUCTION, * 
Petitioner and * 
Cross-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW BY PETITIONER 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
This Court granted review on two issues presented by petitioner Bill Hart: 
1. Whether the requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) apply to 
counterclaims; and 
2. Whether those requirements apply regardless of the remedies to a property 
owner under the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
On certiorari, this Court "review[s] the decision of the court of appeals, not the 
trial court." Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 2006 
UT 38, 17, P.3d (citing Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 
UT 23, f 11, 89 P.3d 155). The court of appeals' interpretation of a statute is 
reviewed for correctness. Id. (citing State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, f 6, 63 P.3d 
667). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-ll(4)(a) & (e) (2001)1: 
(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this 
chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien 
claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner of 
the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's 
rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable 
the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner 
may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
* * * 
(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the residence the 
instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection 4(a), the lien 
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the 
residence. 
The version of section 38-1-11(4) set forth here was in effect in 2002 when Hart 
served his counterclaim complaint on Sill. In 2004, the legislature amended that section. 
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11(4) (Supp. 2004). None of the amendments, however, is 
relevant to the issue before this Court, which must only construe the version of section 
38-1-11(4) that was in place in 2002 (subsection (4) was enacted in 2001, effective April 
30, 2001). Accordingly, all citations to subsection (4) in this brief are to that version. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
The court of appeals set out in its opinion the following accurate summary of the 
nature of this case and the proceedings in the trial court: 
Sill is the owner of real property located in Summit County, Utah 
(the Property). Hart, a general contractor, began construction on the 
Property in the summer of 1999 and continued until approximately 
December 2001, at which time Hart left the job over a dispute with Sill 
regarding the completion of the project. In January 2002, Sill brought an 
action against Hart, alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) 
negligent misrepresentation, (5) intentional misrepresentation, (6) unjust 
enrichment, and (7) defamation. Hart counterclaimed in February 2002, 
alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment, and seeking to 
foreclose a mechanics' lien on the Property. 
More than two and a half years later, in October 2004, Sill for the 
first time raised the issue of Hart's compliance with Utah Code section 
38-1-1 l(4)(a). See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001). The parties 
reserved the issue for post verdict determination, and the case went to 
trial one week later. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hart in the 
amount of $314,500 on Hart's unjust enrichment and mechanics' lien 
claims. In addition, Hart was awarded prejudgment interest, attorney 
fees, and court costs on his mechanics' lien claim. 
Hart thereafter sought to reduce the verdict to judgment. Sill 
opposed the effort insofar as it related to Hart's mechanics' lien claim. 
Sill argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Hart's 
mechanics' lien claim because Hart, when he served his counterclaim on 
Sill, did not include the instructions nor the form affidavit and motion for 
summary judgment required by section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). Hart disagreed, 
arguing that only plaintiffs filing a "complaint" - as opposed to those 
filing a counterclaim - are required to comply with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). 
The trial court agreed with Hart and entered judgment in his favor on both 
the unjust enrichment and the mechanics' lien claims. The court also 
awarded Hart prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and court costs on his 
mechanics' lien claim. Sill timely appealed.2 
Sill v. Hart, 2005 UT App 537, ft 2-4, 128 P.3d 1215 (footnote omitted). 
The Court of Appeals 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling in favor of Hart on his 
mechanics' lien claim. Applying the well-established rules of statutory construction 
that a court looks to the plain language of the statute to determine its meaning and that a 
court does not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there, the court 
of appeals held that under the proper interpretation of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), Hart - a 
"lien claimant" - was required to serve the papers referenced in that section when he 
served his counterclaim on Sill. Sill, 2005 UT App 537, M 8-13. The court rejected 
the trial court's and Hart's view that the term "complaint" as used in subsection (4)(a) 
referred only to the initial pleading filed by a plaintiff to commence a lawsuit and did 
not include a defendant's counterclaim initiating an action to enforce a lien filed under 
the mechanics' lien statutes. Id, The court noted that "although the statute specifically 
references 'the service of a complaint,' the term 'complaint' is frequently interpreted in 
Utah caselaw as including counterclaims[.]" Id. at \ 13. And, noting that "the statute 
at issue applies to a lien claimant filing 'an action to enforce a lien filed under [the 
mechanics' lien statutes] [,]'" the court observed that "Utah courts have interpreted 
2
 Sill paid Hart the $314,500 awarded him on the unjust enrichment claim. Sill also has 
paid Hart the $5,598.92 awarded him in costs. (R. 1496, Partial Satisfaction of 
Judgment). 
A 
similar language to include counterclaims." Id. at 1 12 (first brackets in original). It 
therefore rejected the trial court's and Hart's contention that because Hart had served a 
"counterclaim" rather than a "complaint," the requirement to serve the papers 
referenced in subsection (4)(a) did not apply to him. Id. at 1 13. 
The court of appeals also rejected Hart's arguments that subsection (4)(a) did not 
apply to him because (1) he had not ufile[d] an action" in this case (according to him, 
only Sill had done that) and (2) Sill ultimately had no right to relief under the Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act (LRFA).3 It concluded that subsection 
(4)(a) clearly applied to Hart, noting that under (4)(a)'s plain language "the statute here 
is triggered if a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under the Mechanics' 
Liens Act involving a residence as defined by section 38-11-102" - precisely what Hart 
had done in filing his counterclaim against Sill. Sill, 2005 UT App 537 t l 9-10. As 
for Hart's contention that because Sill ultimately had no right to relief under the LRFA, 
the court concluded that "the responsibility of determining whether the owner being 
sued has rights under the [LRFA] does not belong to the lien claimant." Id. at 1 9 n.3. 
In short, that was not a basis for Hart to avoid the requirements of (4)(a). 
Having interpreted (4)(a) to apply to Hart, the court of appeals rejected Sill's 
argument that Hart's failure to comply with (4)(a) deprived the trial court of jurisdiction 
to hear Hart's lien foreclosure action. Instead, it held that "Hart's failure to comply 
3
 Title 38, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code. 
with [that] section * * * 'constitutes] an avoidance or affirmative defense' under rule 
8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. at 1 15. 
Hart filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied. This Court then granted 
his petition for certiorari and Sill's cross-petition. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
It is undisputed that when Hart served his counterclaim complaint (setting forth 
the mechanic's lien foreclosure action) on Sill in 2002, Hart did not include with the 
complaint the instructions and forms described in subsection (4)(a). That is the only 
fact relevant to the issues presented for review. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a) (2001), a provision in Utah's 
mechanics' lien statutes, a lien claimant who files "an action" against an owner of a 
residence to enforce a mechanics' lien must serve on the owner certain instructions and 
forms with the "complaint" that initiates the foreclosure action. In light of this Court's 
and the court of appeals' case law that makes clear that a counterclaim institutes "an 
action," and the common understanding that the term "complaint" includes a 
counterclaim, the court of appeals correctly interpreted subsection (4)(a) to apply to Bill 
Hart, who, as a lien claimant, filed an action by way of a counterclaim to enforce his 
mechanics' lien against Joel Sill's property. 
That interpretation of the statute is in harmony with settled rules of statutory 
construction, namely that when construing a statute, a court (1) must read the plain 
language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions consistently with other 
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters, (2) must assume that each statutory 
term is used advisedly and that the intent of the legislature is revealed by the use of the 
term in the context and structure in which it is placed, and (3) must consider as its 
primary goal giving effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the statute's plain 
language and the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. 
ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals correctly interpreted the plain language of subsection (4) (a) to 
require Hart, a lien claimant, to serve with his counterclaim complaint the 
instructions and forms identified in that provision. 
A. In construing subsection (4)(a), the court of appeals correctly concluded that 
the term "complaint" includes a counterclaim. 
Hart argues that the court of appeals violated two rules of statutory construction 
by interpreting the term "complaint" as used in subsection (4)(a) to include a 
counterclaim: (1) a court must assume that each term was used advisedly and thus the 
statutory words must be read literally, and (2) a court may not infer substantive terms 
into the text that are not already there. The premise for that argument is that neither 
standing alone nor in the context of subsection (4)(a) is the term "complaint" 
reasonably interpreted to include a counterclaim. As shown below, that premise lacks 
support in precedent from both the Utah courts and courts in other jurisdictions, and in 
the major treatises. 
1. The meaning of "an action" in subsection (4) (a) 
Subsection (4)(a) provides: 
If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under [the 
mechanics' lien statutes] involving a residence, as defined in Section 38-
11-102, the lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint 
on the owner of the residence [certain instructions and papers.] 
The term "complaint" as used in that provision must be interpreted in the context in 
which it used. See Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984) (this Court 
assumes that "each term [in a statute] is used advisedly and that the intent of the 
Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the context and structure in which it is 
placed"). "Complaint" refers back to "an action" filed by a lien claimant to enforce a 
lien. Thus, the starting point for determining the meaning of "complaint" is the 
meaning of the term "action." 
In American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P. 2d 
185 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), a case decided four years before the legislature enacted 
subsection (4)(a), the court of appeals interpreted the phrase "action brought to enforce 
any lien under this chapter" in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-18(1) (Supp. 1996) (the 
provision relating to the award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in a 
mechanics' lien action) to include a counterclaim. The court held that "a counterclaim 
to foreclose [a] mechanics' lien[] * * * clearly qualifies as 'an action brought to enforce 
any lien' under the mechanics' lien statute." 939 P.2d at 193. The court of appeals' 
holding in the instant case that the nearly identical phrase at the beginning of subsection 
(4)(a) - "an action to enforce a lien filed under this chapter" - also includes a 
counterclaim (and thus the word "complaint," which follows that phrase and is used 
with no qualifying or limiting language, naturally would include a counterclaim) is in 
harmony with settled rules of statutory construction. Specifically, in construing a 
statute, a court assumes that when the legislature enacted the statute, it was aware of 
prior court decisions interpreting similar statutory language. Donahue v. Warner Bros. 
Picture Distributing Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 261, 272 P.2d 177, 180 (1954). In short, 
nothing in the plain language of subsection (4)(a) suggests that the legislature intended 
for the "action" referenced therein to have a more limited scope than the "action" 
referenced in section 38-1-18(1), which the court of appeals previously had interpreted 
in American Rural Cellular to include a counterclaim. 
In an effort to avoid the court of appeals' construction of the term "action" in 
American Rural Cellular, Hart argues that the language of section 38-1-18(1) is very 
different from the language in subsection (4)(a), because the word "any" is in front of 
the word "action" in section 38-1-18 and not in subsection (4)(a). He contends that 
"any action" and "an action" are so significantly different that one is compelled to 
conclude that "an action" in subsection (4)(a) does not include a counterclaim. As 
explained below, that the legislature intended such fine distinctions between the words 
used in section 38-1-18 and the nearly identical words used in subsection (4)(a) simply 
is not apparent from either American Rural Cellular or the plain language of subsection 
(4)(a). 
At bottom, Hart's argument on this point is anchored in his contention that the 
legislature's use in subsection (4)(a) of the term "complaint," which he insists must be 
interpreted narrowly to refer only to an original complaint filed by a plaintiff, reflects 
an intent to limit the scope of the term "action" to an original action filed by a lien 
claimant as a plaintiff. That construction, however, is plausible only if one accepts 
Hart's position that the undefined term "complaint" - standing alone without any 
limiting language - is not reasonably interpreted as including a counterclaim and 
necessarily means only an original complaint filed by a plaintiff. That view is contrary 
to the prevailing view that a counterclaim is a complaint and that when Ihe term 
"complaint" is used in a statute with no qualifying language, it naturally includes a 
counterclaim. 
In American Rural Cellular, the court of appeals specifically held that "a 
counterclaim to foreclose [a] mechanics' lien * * * clearly qualifies as 'an action 
brought to enforce any lien' under the mechanics' lien statute." 939 P.2d at 193. It 
expressly said the words "an action" included a counterclaim, thus placing no 
significance on the word "any" that preceded the word "action" in section 38-1-18(1). 
Assuming - as one must - that the legislature was aware of American Rural Cellular 
when it drafted subsection (4)(a), its use of "an action" in the introductory clause can 
only be interpreted to carry the same meaning as the court of appeals gave "an action" 
in American Rural Cellular - that is, "an action" includes a counterclaim. 
Had the more restrictive reading of subsection (4)(a) Hart proposes been 
intended, the legislature - mindful of the construction of "an action" in American Rural 
Cellular - certainly would have made explicit an intent to limit subsection (4)(a)'s reach 
to an original complaint filed by a lien claimant as a plaintiff. It is unreasonable to 
think, as Hart would have it, that the legislature used in subsection (4)(a) the words "an 
action" - precisely the words the court of appeals said included a counterclaim - but 
intended to leave to the reader of (4)(a) the task of divining a contrary legislative intent 
to give those words a meaning different from that determined in American Rural 
Cellular. Had the legislature intended the restriction Hart says it did, it would have 
made that intention clear by providing, for example: "If a lien claimant files an action, 
as a plaintiff in an original complaint and not as a counterclaimant, to enforce a lien 
filed under this chapter * * *." To think otherwise is to ascribe to the legislature a 
hide-the-ball attitude in its enactment of subsection (4)(a) that simply is not suggested in 
anything Hart cites to this Court. 
2. The meaning of "complaint" in subsection (4) (a) 
With the foregoing statutory context in mind {i.e., as used in subsection (4)(a), 
"an action" plainly includes a counterclaim), Hart's proposed interpretation of the term 
"complaint" now can be addressed. He contends that because that term is not 
commonly understood to include a counterclaim, the legislature must have intended for 
"complaint" to limit the scope of "an action," which precedes "complaint" in 
subsection (4)(a), to an original complaint filed by a lien claimant as a plaintiff, thereby 
excluding a counterclaim complaint from subsection (4)(a)'s coverage. For the 
following reasons, that argument fails. 
Hart first cites definitions of "complaint" from Black's Law Diclionary and Rule 
3(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as support for his apparent contention that an 
"action" can only be commenced by a plaintiffs original complaint accompanied by 
service of a summons. Pet.'s Br. 13-14. He reasons, therefore, that when the 
legislature referenced a "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a), it must have intended to 
restrict the application of that provision to a plaintiff lien claimant who files an original 
complaint and to exclude the defendant lien claimant who files a counterclaim 
complaint. 
The fundamental problem with that analysis is that rides on the notion that a 
counterclaim does not commence an "action" under Utah law. That simply is 
incorrect. As this Court said long ago, "[a] counterclaim is viewed as an original 
action, instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff and is tested by the same tests 
and rules as a complaint." Harman v. Yeager, 103 Utah 208, 134 P.2d 695, 696 
(1943). See also State ex rel Road Comm'n v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585, 
587 (1962) ("[N]either under our rules or elsewhere, can a counterclainiant cast himself 
in any other role than that of a plaintiff."), overruled in part on other grounds, 
Coleman v. State Lands Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). That view is the prevailing 
view in this country. See, e.g., Kane v. Kane, 558 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (A.D. 1990) 
("A counterclaim is in essence a complaint by a defendant against the plaintiff and 
alleges a present viable cause of action upon which the defendant seeks judgment. It is 
not a responsive pleading merely because it is contained in a responsive paper; to wit, 
the answer. It is not a defense. * * * The pleader of a counterclaim is a plaintiff in his 
own right." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 1184 at 24-25 (3d ed. 2004) ("Since a counterclaim basically 
is a defendant's complaint, it is perfectly logical to oblige a plaintiff to respond to it." 
(emphasis added)).4 
Hart next cites Rules 7(a) and 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
asserts that the "Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognize 'complaints' and 
counterclaims as distinct and different, including defining them in completely different 
rules." Neither of those rules, however, supports his view that "complaint" as used in 
Subsection (4)(a) cannot include a counterclaim. 
Rule 7(a) defines "pleadings": 
Pleadings, There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a 
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-
claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party 
4
 Not surprisingly, the courts - this Court included - frequently refer to the pleading 
that sets forth a counterclaim as a "counterclaim complaint." See, e.g., Lundahl v. 
Quinn, 2003 UT 11, f 1, 67 P.3d 1000 ("she has filed a motion to intervene and an 
amended counterclaim complaint"); Berckeley Investment Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 259 
F.3d 135, 138 (3rd Cir. 2001) ("Colkitt reasserted those counterclaims not dismissed 
with prejudice in an amended counterclaim complaint"); Foundation for Interior Design 
Educ. Res. v. Savannah College of Art & Design, 244 F.3d 521, 531 (6th Cir. 2001) 
("College alleged in its counterclaim complaint * * *"); Federal Kemper Life Assur. 
Co. v. Ellis, 28 F.3d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Defendant then filed a motion for 
leave to file an answer and amended counterclaim complaint"). 
is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if 
a third-party complaint is served. 
Hart acknowledges that a counterclaim is a "pleading." See Pet.'s Br. 15 (arguing that 
had the legislature intended for Subsection (4)(a) to apply to a counterclaim, it "could 
have used the term 'pleading' instead of 'complaint'"). 
Assuming that when the legislature drafted subsection (4)(a) it looked to Rule 
7(a) for a "pleading" that would cover both an original complaint and a counterclaim, it 
necessarily would have chosen "complaint" from the list of "pleadings" contained in 
that rule. That is so because "counterclaim" is not expressly set forth in Rule 7(a), and 
thus a "counterclaim" - acknowledged to be a "pleading" - must be subsumed in the 
term "complaint." A counterclaim certainly is not an "answer," a "reply to a 
counterclaim," an "answer to a cross-claim," a "third-party complaint," or a "third-
party answer" - the other "pleadings" listed in Rule 7(a), all of which the legislature 
naturally would have rejected as not descriptive of a counterclaim. On the other hand, 
selection of the term "complaint" from Rule 7(a) would be entirely consistent with the 
prevailing view of courts and commentators that a counterclaim is a complaint, it just is 
one filed by a defendant against a plaintiff. Rule 7(a) therefore does not advance Hart's 
contention that the legislature, by using the term "complaint" in subsection (4)(a), must 
have intended a reference only to an original complaint filed by a plaintiff.5 
5
 The trial court also cited Rule 7(a) in support of its conclusion that the term 
"complaint" in subsection (4)(a) does not include a counterclaim. Memorandum 
Decision 3 (copy contained in Addendum No. 3 to Hart's opening brief). The court 
As for Rule 13(a), which talks about compulsory counterclaims, it is not clear 
why Hart believes that rule compels such a clear distinction between a counterclaim and 
a complaint that the legislature could not have intended that the term "complaint" in 
subsection (4)(a) include a counterclaim. Nothing in the plain language of Rule 13(a) 
suggests that a counterclaim is not a complaint. Moreover, Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure recognizes that a complaint and a counterclaim are in substance the 
same pleading: 
Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief 
to which he deems himself entitled. 
In short, the rules Hart cites do not advance his argument.6 
Significantly, and perhaps most telling, is that Hart does not cite a single 
decision where a court has construed the statutory term "complaint" not to include a 
counterclaim. Indeed, numerous courts faced with the question have construed the term 
to include a counterclaim. See, e.g., Uncle Henry's, Inc. v. Plaut Consulting, Inc., 
382 F.Supp.2d 150, 154 (D. Me. 2005) ("I conclude that the only reasonable way to 
read the statute is to interpret the word 'complaint' to mean the pleading asserting the 
described Rule 7(a) as "distinguishing a complaint from other pleadings"; however, it 
failed to observe that Rule 7(a) does not distinguish a "complaint" from a "counterclaim." 
6
 Hart's cites UTAH CODE ANN. § 42-2-10 (2005) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-35 (2002) 
as support for his argument that the legislature intended to limit the word "complaint" as 
used in subsection (4)(a) to an original complaint filed by lien claimant as a plaintiff and 
claim in question, here Plaut Consulting^ counterclaim."); Wilson v. Baldwin, 519 
S.E.2d 251, 253 (Ga. App. 1999) (noting that the term "complaint" equates with the 
term "counterclaim" for purposes of the statute at issue); Brink's Inc. v. City of New 
York, 533 F.Supp. 1122, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The City's argument that section 
203(c) does not apply because the statute uses the term 'complaint,' whereas in the 
instant case Brink's is attempting to assert the recoupment against a 'counterclaim' is 
without merit; indeed, it borders on the frivolous."); Breech v. Hughes Tool Co., 41 
Del. Ch. 128, 189 A.2d 428, 429-30 (Del. 1963) (statute providing that if it appears in 
any "complaint" filed in chancery court that a defendant is a nonresident, court may 
order his appearance and may provide for seizure of his property, is not to be strictly 
construed to end that "complaint" exclude a counterclaim, but rather a counterclaim 
against a nonresident is within the purview of the statute).7 
not as a counterclaimant. Pet.'s Br. 14. Those statutes do not help him, because they do 
not mirror the context in which "complaint" is used in subsection (4)(a). 
7
 In the court of appeals, Hart argued that Wilson v. Baldwin and Brinks, Inc. v. City of 
New York supported the trial court's construction of subsection (4)(a) rather than the one 
the court of appeals adopted. Those cases, however, do support the court of appeals' 
construction. In Wilson, the statute at issue prohibited bringing "a complaint seeking to 
obtain a change of legal custody" of a child "[a]s a counterclaim." Wilson, 519 S.E.2d at 
327. That statutory prohibition illustrates the common understanding that the term 
"complaint" includes a counterclaim. If that were not the commonly understood meaning 
of "complaint," there would be no need for an express prohibition against bringing a 
complaint in the form of a counterclaim. The absence of similar limiting language with 
respect to the term "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) indicates a legislative intent that 
"complaint" be given its commonly understood meaning (i.e., the term includes a 
counterclaim), (continued on next page) 
What Hart cannot avoid is that the term "complaint," when used in the absence 
of limiting language, is commonly understood to include a counterclaim. See, e.g., 
Liberty Chevrolet, Inc. v. Rainey, 791 N.E.2d 625, 629 (111. App. 2003) ("[W]e agree 
with the trial court that, under the Agreement, a counterclaim is a 'complaint.'"); 
Lebrecht v. Orefice, 105 N.Y.S.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1951) ("In the absence of language 
indicating a legislative intent that Section 23 * * * shall be inapplicable to 
counterclaims, this court is of the opinion that Section 23 applies equally to complaints 
and counterclaims, since for all practical purposes the counterclaim is the same as a 
complaint."); Quality Clothes Shop v. Keeney, 106 N.E. 541, 542 (Ind. App. 1914) 
("It would seem, therefore, that, by the express language of the statute, a counterclaim 
is a complaint, and the courts have held repeatedly that a counterclaim is similar in 
character to a complaint, and is, in fact, in the nature of a complaint against the 
plaintiff."). 
(cont.) 
The Brink's court, in construing the statutory term "complaint" in one statute to 
include a counterclaim, relied on the following language from another statute: "A cause 
of action contained in a counterclaim or a cross-claim shall be treated, as far as 
practicable, as if it were contained in a complaint." Brink's Inc., 533 F.Supp. at 1123 n.3. 
Direct parallels to that provision exist in Utah law. As noted above, it is well-settled in 
this state that "[a] counterclaim is viewed as an original action, instituted by the 
defendant against the plaintiff and is tested by the same tests and rules as a complaint." 
Harman, 134 P.2d at 696. Further, under Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
counterclaim must meet precisely the same standards as a complaint. Those parallels lead 
one to the same conclusion that the Brink's court reached: the term "complaint" includes 
a counterclaim. 
3. The Second Circuit's decision in Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal InVl 
v. Pelella 
Lacking any persuasive authority to support his view that the term "complaint" 
is not commonly understood to include a counterclaim, Hart offers Local Union No. 38} 
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73 (2nd Cir. 2003), as support for his 
position that the word "complaint" in subsection (4)(a) must be read as limiting the 
word "action" to an action commenced by an original complaint filed by a lien claimant 
as a plaintiff. The principal point from Pelella he asks this Court to consider is the 
two-judge majority's conclusion that the term "action," as used in section 101(a)(4) of 
the federal Labor-Management Reporting and Act, does not embrace a counterclaim, 
because "action" is qualified by the phrase "to institute." Hart argues by analogy that 
the term "action" in subsection (4)(a), because it is qualified by the subsequent phrase 
"service of the complaint," likewise does not embrace a counterclaim. For the 
following reasons, that analogy does not work. 
The Pelella majority's construction of "action" was based on the view that "[a] 
defendant does not 'institute' an action when he asserts a counterclaim." 350 F.3d at 
82. According to the majority, an action is only "instituted" when a plaintiff files a 
complaint and "[i]n sharp contrast, a defendant asserts a counterclaim in response to a 
plaintiff's institution of an action." Id. Thus, the "sharp contrast" the majority found 
between a "complaint" and a "counterclaim" lay in the perception that one does not 
"institute an action" by filing a counterclaim. Hart asks this Court to adopt essentially 
the same view and apply it in construing the terms "action" and "complaint" in 
subsection (4)(a). Pet.'s Br. 20 ("[Pelella] also confirms that a counterclaim is 
properly considered as something in 'sharp contrast' from a 'complaint.' Subsection 
(4)(a) does not apply to this case in which Hart did not file this 'action' nor serve a 
'complaint[.]'"). 
The problem with Hart's invitation to adopt the Pelella majority's reasoning in 
interpreting subsection (4)(a) is that the majority's major premise - that one does not 
institute an action through a counterclaim - is directly contrary to Utah law. As 
previously noted, this Court has made clear that "[a] counterclaim is viewed as an 
original action, instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff and is tested by the same 
tests and rules as a complaint," Harmon, 134 P.2d at 696. Further, the court of 
appeals held in American Rural Cellular that "an action" included a counterclaim. This 
Court in Harmon, like many other courts across the country, correctly equated a 
counterclaim with a complaint. Hart cannot escape that. Nor can it be assumed that 
the legislature, when it enacted subsection (4)(a), was unaware of Harman, which 
expresses the clear majority view that a counterclaim is in substance a complaint. In 
short, Pelella is inapposite; its reasoning cannot be harmonized with settled Utah law.8 
In a well-reasoned opinion, the dissenting judge in Pelella concluded that "the right to 
'institute an action' includes the right to assert a counterclaim." 350 F.3d at 92 (Straub, 
J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent's analysis is consistent with Utah law, not the 
majority's. 
4. Summary 
Given the juxtaposition of the terms "action" and "complaint" in subsection 
(4)(a), this Court's and the court of appeals' pre-S/// v. Hart decisions making clear that 
"an action" may be instituted by a counterclaim, and the common understanding of the 
word "complaint" to include a counterclaim, the court of appeals correctly interpreted 
subsection (4)(a) to apply to counterclaims. It faithfully applied the principles that, in 
construing a statute, a court must look to its plain language as a whole, Miller v. 
Weaver, 2003 UT 12, t 17, 66 P.3d 592, and must interpret a statutory term according 
to its commonly understood meaning. Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 
1989). Moreover, the court of appeals' interpretation of (4)(a) is in harmony with the 
statute's obvious purpose, which is to ensure that a homeowner is informed of his or 
her rights under the LRFA when a lien claimant brings an action against the 
homeowner to enforce a mechanics' lien. See Board ofEduc. of Jordan School Dist. v. 
Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, if 8, 94 P.3d 234 (a court's "aim in construing a statute 
is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant 
to achieve."). 
B. The plain language of subsection (4)(a) requires that all lien claimants, 
including general or original contractors like Hart, comply with its 
provisions. 
Apparently as an alternative to his argument that subsection (4)(a) does not apply 
to counterclaims because it references service of a "complaint," Hart contends that, in 
any event, (4)(a) did not require him to serve the referenced instructions and forms 
because Sill had no rights under the LRFA with respect to Hart, a general or original 
contractor (hereafter simply "general contractor"). Hart reasons that because the 
LRFA gives a homeowner rights only with respect to subcontractors, the legislature 
could not have intended for subsection (4)(a) to apply to a general contractor like 
himself.9 As explained below, that argument fails for a variety of reasons. 
1. Subsection (4)(a)'s plain language 
The initial problem with Hart's argument is that it fails to recognize that 
subsection (4)(a), by its terms, sets a notice requirement that applies to all lien 
claimants. As previously noted, the clear purpose of (4)(a) is to ensure that a 
homeowner is alerted to the rights created by the LRFA when a lien claimant brings an 
action to enforce a mechanics' lien. Under the plain language of (4)(a), a "lien 
claimant" who "files an action to enforce a lien filed under [the mechanics' lien 
statutes] involving a residence" must serve with the "complaint" (which, as previously 
discussed, naturally includes a counterclaim complaint) certain instructions and forms 
relating to the LRFA. Hart argues that notwithstanding that plain language, (4)(a) is 
not reasonably interpreted to obligate a general contractor like himself - as opposed to a 
subcontractor - to comply with its requirements, because the LRFA only applies to 
claims and liens of subcontractors, not to those of general contractors. The 
Although Hart does not come right out and say it, his argument necessarily applies to 
any general contractor who brings an action to enforce a mechanics' lien against a 
homeowner, whether that is by the filing of an original complaint as a plaintiff or by the 
filing of a counterclaim as a defendant. In other words, Hart's argument is that 
fundamental problem with that argument is that the plain language of (4)(a) must be 
ignored to adopt Hart's view. 
Nowhere in the mechanics' lien statutes, subsection (4)(a) included, is there so 
much as a hint that "lien claimant" does not include a general contractor like Hart. 
Where the legislature intended to draw distinctions between a general (or original) 
contractor and a subcontractor, it used those specific terms to distinguish the two. See, 
e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 38-1-2 (defining and distinguishing "original contractor" and 
"subcontractor"), -14 (separating "original contractors" and "subcontractors"), -17 
(separating "contractor" and "subcontractor") (2005). Thus, on its face, subsection 
(4)(a)'s requirement that the "lien claimant" serve certain instructions and forms on the 
sued homeowner applies to anyone who has filed a lien under the mechanics' lien 
statutes, including a general contractor. Had the legislature intended to limit the reach 
of subsection (4)(a) to subcontractors, then it would have said just that - for example: 
"If a lien claimant who is a subcontractor files an action to enforce a lien * * *." 
There also is no merit to Hart's additional argument that subsection (4)(a) does 
not apply in the situation where the homeowner ultimately is unable to exercise rights 
under the LRFA. Subsection (4)(a) does not limit the instructions/forms requirement to 
those situations where the homeowner ultimately is able to exercise rights under the 
LRFA. Nor does it exempt from that requirement a lien claimant who may believe the 
subsection (4)(a) does not apply to a general contractor under any circumstances, because 
the homeowner has no rights against a general contractor under the LRFA. 
owner has no such rights. Subsection (4)(a) simply sets forth a notice requirement with 
which the lien claimant must comply. 
Hart's view that serving the required instructions and forms on Sill or other 
homeowners in his position would be useless is of no import. The legislature has 
decided otherwise, and "[i]t is not the function of this Court to evaluate the wisdom or 
practical necessities of legislative enactments." Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County 
Commission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Utah 1981). Obviously, the legislature did not 
want the lien claimant deciding whether the homeowner in a given case is eligible for 
relief under the LRFA; it wanted to ensure that the sued owner would be the one 
making that determination, informed by the instructions and forms served in 
compliance with subsection (4)(a). Hart cannot escape the mandatory requirements of 
subsection (4)(a) simply because he thinks they are a bad idea under certain 
circumstances. See LKL v. Farley, 2004 UT 51, 1 8, 94 P.3d 279 (rejecting 
condominium owners' broad interpretation of the term "residences" as used in the 
LRFA as contrary to the statutory definition, and observing that although "their 
argument might represent good policy, * * * [i]n order for this court to accept the 
owners' position and affirm the trial court, we would be forced to ignore a clear 
statutory mandate and render the definition chosen by the legislature meaningless"). 
Instructive on this point is Landmark Systems, Inc. v. Delmar Redevelopment 
Corp., 900 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), where the Missouri Court of Appeals 
correctly rejected a similar attack on a notice requirement in that state's mechanic's lien 
statutes. There, the lien claimant argued that its failure to comply with the requirement 
should not bar its lien because the liened property owner was "a large corporation 
sophisticated in the areas of real estate and construction" and "had knowledge of the 
mechanic's lien law." 900 S.W.2d at 261. The court disagreed: 
It is true, as [the lien claimant] suggests, the purpose of § 429.012 
is to warn inexperienced property owners of the danger to them which 
lurks in the mechanic's lien statute. However, this court is also aware the 
requirements of our statute are mandatory. The statute does not limit the 
necessity of this notice to those inexperienced with, or having lack of 
knowledge about, the mechanic's lien laws. The statute has no exceptions 
and this court will not accept the invitation to create an exception in this 
case. Additionally, * * * allowing a lien where there was not substantial 
compliance with the notice provision contained in § 429.012 would add 
another issue to each mechanic's lien case, namely the extent of the 
property owner's knowledge of the mechanic's lien laws. The fact such 
an exception was not incorporated into the statute indicates the legislature 
did not intend such a result. 
900 S.W.2d at 261-62 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
That analysis applies with equal force here in determining the reach of 
subsection (4)(a). Whether the circumstances in any given case are such that a 
homeowner is or is not in a position to exercise rights under the LRFA may be an issue 
in many mechanics' lien cases when litigation begins. It is precisely for that reason that 
the legislature could have reasonably determined that subsection (4)(a)'s requirements 
would apply to all lien claimants, thereby avoiding litigation on the question of whether 
a lien claimant in a particular case justifiably decided not to provide the homeowner 
with the instructions and forms.10 
In sum, subsection (4)(a) plainly applies to all lien claimants, Hart included. 
The legislature did not carve out any exceptions to the instructions and forms 
requirement, and this Court should not create one.11 
Hart makes much out of the reference to "available rights" in subsection (4)(a)(ii), 
arguing that because Sill had no rights against him as a general contractor, he therefore 
was relieved of any obligation to comply with subsection (4)(a). As previously 
discussed, had the legislature intended to exempt general contractors from the 
requirements of (4)(a), it would have made that explicit by limiting "lien claimant" to 
subcontractors. Despite all of Hart's protestations, the plain language of (4)(a) requires 
all lien claimants who bring an action to enforce a mechanics' lien - general contractors 
and subcontractors alike - to serve the instructions and forms. That the "available rights" 
for a homeowner under the LRFA may only be against subcontractors is of no 
consequence. The legislature obviously intended for this notice provision to apply to all 
lien claimants. In any event, even if Hart's tortured interpretation of (4)(a)(ii) were 
correct, the "available rights" language only refers to the "form affidavit and motion for 
summary judgment" that must be served; there is no similar language in (4)(a)(i), which 
requires that the "instructions" be served. Thus, even under Hart's proposed 
interpretation of (4)(a)(ii), he still would not be relieved of the obligation to serve the 
instructions under (4)(a)(i). He, of course, failed to do that. 
Additionally, Hart takes issue with the court of appeals' statement that "the 
responsibility of determining whether the owner being sued has rights under the [LRFA] 
does not belong to the lien claimant." Sill, 2005 UT App at \ 9 n.3 (Pet.'s Br. 26). He 
insists that because he is a general contractor, as opposed to a subcontractor, subsection 
(4)(a) must be construed not to apply to him. Again, Hart is asking this Court, as he did 
the court of appeals, to ignore the plain language of the statute, which obligates a "lien 
claimant" to do certain things, drawing no distinction between the lien claimant who is a 
general contractor and the lien claimant who is a subcontractor. 
The legislative history Hart cites provides him no help. It only confirms what the 
parties have acknowledged all along: The LRFA applies to claims and liens by 
subcontractors. That fact does not alter the analysis of what legislative intent the plain 
language of subsection (4)(a) reflects, insofar as the notice requirements in that provision 
are concerned. 
2. The statutory scheme 
The additional flaw in Hart's argument that subsection (4)(a) could not apply to 
general contractors due to the reference to the LRFA is that it ignores other related 
statutory provisions which undermine that view. A quick look at the statutory scheme 
the legislature has adopted for providing a homeowner notice of LRFA rights illustrates 
the point. 
Hart's implicit argument that the legislature could not have intended to require a 
general contractor (as opposed to a subcontractor) to give the homeowner notice of 
rights under the LRFA through the service of the papers specified in subsection (4)(a) is 
defeated by other provisions in the mechanics' lien statutes. Two prominent provisions 
illustrate that the legislature intended to require a general contractor to give the 
homeowner notice of LRFA rights throughout the contractor-homeowner relationship. 
First, a general contractor has a statutory obligation to give the homeowner 
notice of those rights early on in that relationship: 
Beginning July 1, 1995, the original contractor or real estate 
developer shall state in the written contract with the owner what actions 
are necessary for the owner to be protected under Section 38-11-107 
[(part of the LRFA)] from the maintaining of a mechanic's lien or other 
civil action against the owner or the owner-occupied residence to recover 
monies owed for qualified services. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-11-108(1) (2005). Second, a lien claimant - whether a general 
contractor or a subcontractor - is required to inform the homeowner of LRFA rights at 
the time the lien is filed: 
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement 
setting forth: 
* * # 
(h) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in 
Section 38-11-102, a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined 
in Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove the 
lien in accordance with Section 38-11-107. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(2)(a)(ix) (2005). 
The foregoing provisions obviously are relevant to determining what the 
legislature intended in adopting the strict notice requirement for a lien claimant that 
appears in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). A court must "read the plain language of the statute 
as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same 
chapter and related chapters:' Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, 1 17, 66 P.3d 592 
(emphasis added). When the entire statutory scheme is considered, one is unable to 
conclude, as Hart contends, that the legislature intended to exclude a general contractor 
when it referenced "lien claimant" in subsection (4)(a). 
C. The court of appeals' construction of subsection (4)(a) does not undermine 
the basic purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes. 
Hart's final attack on the court of appeals' interpretation of subsection (4)(a) is 
that it undermines the intent and purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes. Specifically, 
he contends that the court of appeals' decision is is contrary to "[t]he purpose of the 
mechanic's lien * * * to protect those whose labor or materials have enhanced the value 
of property." A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, 
1 24, 94 P.3d 270. See Pet. 's Br. 29-31. He apparently is of the view that any 
homeowner-protective interpretation of a provision in the mechanics' lien statutes 
cannot stand because it is contrary to that general purpose. That view, however, is at 
odds with the settled principle that "compliance with the [procedural provisions of the 
mechanics' lien] statute[s] is required before a party is entitled to the benefits created 
by the statutefs]." AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Development and Energy 
Company, 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1989). 
In short, the general purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes to protect those who 
have enhanced the value of property by supplying materials or labor does not permit a 
court or lien claimant to ignore procedural requirements in the statutory scheme that are 
designed to protect the homeowner as opposed to the lien claimant. Given that a 
"mechanics' lien is a creature of statute," AAA Fencing Company, 714 P.2d at 291, the 
legislature is free to enact whatever procedural prerequisites to enforcement of a lien 
and recovery of costs and attorney fees it believes are appropriate. Indeed, prior to the 
enactment of subsection (4)(a), the legislature had imposed other procedural 
requirements on the lien claimant, noncompliance with which results in a bar to 
enforcement of the lien or to the recovery of costs and attorney fees. See, e.g., UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 38-1-11(1) (2005) (setting forth the time period for commencing an action 
to enforce a lien, which must be complied with or the lien is invalidated, as this Court 
held in,4A4 Fencing Company); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(3)(c) (2005) ("Failure to 
deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner precludes the 
lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or 
record owner in an action to enforce the lien."). 
In light of the foregoing, the court of appeals' construction of the plain language 
of subsection (4)(a) does not undermine the purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes 
simply because it is detrimental to Hart's position in this case (that is, to his effort to 
collect prejudgment interest and attorney fees). Contrary to Hart's contention, the 
result is not a windfall for Sill. 
Hart first complains that the court of appeals' decision unfairly eliminates 
prejudgment interest owed by Sill. What Hart fails to disclose, however, is that under 
Utah law he could have asked the jury to include prejudgment interest in the damages 
awarded on his unjust enrichment claim. See Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah 
County, 835 P.2d 207, 212 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("we hold that prejudgment interest 
must be sought directly as damages in unjust enrichment cases"). He did not do that, 
electing to tie the prejudgment interest request exclusively to the mechanics' lien action. 
As for his additional complaint that reversal of the attorney fee award unfairly penalizes 
him, the penalty imposed for his procedural default (i.e., failure to comply with 
subsection (4)(a)) is no more severe than the penalty the legislature has seen fit to 
impose for similar procedural defaults. For example, as previously noted, a lien 
claimant's "failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees 
* * * in an action to enforce the lien." § 38-l-7(3)(c). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' 
holding that subsection (4)(a) applied to Hart's counterclaim complaint, which instituted 
an action to enforce his mechanics' lien against Sill's property. 
CROSS-PETITION 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW BY CROSS-PETITIONER 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
This Court granted review on one issue presented by cross-petitioner Joel Sill: 
1. Whether a counterclaimant's failure to comply with UTAH CODE ANN. §38-1-
ll(4)(a) creates a jurisdictional bar to adjudication of an action to enforce a lien. 
On certiorari, this Court "review[s] the decision of the court of appeals, not the 
trial court." Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 2006 
UT 38, f 7, P.3d (citing Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 
UT 23, if 11, 89 P.3d 155). The court of appeals' interpretation of a statute is 
reviewed for correctness. Id. (citing State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, \ 6, 63 P.3d 
667). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the plain language of subsections (4)(a) and (e), a lien claimant's failure 
to comply with the requirements of subsection (4)(a) upon filing an action to enforce a 
mechanics' lien results in a jurisdictional bar to that action. The statute is 
straightforward: If the lien claimant fails to comply with subsection (4)(a), the lien 
claimant is barred from both maintaining and enforcing the lien. The statutory bar on 
maintenance of the lien results in an extinguishment of the lien at the point of the lien 
claimant's failure to comply with (4)(a). Based on settled case law from this Court, 
noncompliance with subsection (4)(a) therefore creates a jurisdictional bar to 
adjudication of an action to enforce a lien. The court of appeals erred in concluding 
otherwise. 
ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals erred in holding that subsection (4)(a) is not jurisdictional by 
misinterpreting and misapplying this Court's controlling case law, 
A. Introduction 
As discussed above, the court of appeals interpreted subsection (4)(a) to apply to 
Hart, holding that under the plain language of that provision he was required to include 
with service of his counterclaim on Sill certain instructions and papers related to the 
LRFA. Then, based on its recent decision in Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383, 121 
P.3d 717, the court rejected Sill's argument that under the plain language of section 38-
l-ll(4)(e), the result of Hart's noncompliance with subsection (4)(a) was a 
jurisdictional bar to Hart's mechanics' lien foreclosure action. Instead, the court 
viewed Hart's noncompliance with (4)(a) as an affirmative defense for Sill and 
remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings on that defense. As 
explained below, the court's holding in the instant case that subsection (4)(a) is not 
jurisdictional is contrary to the plain language of subsection (4)(e). The Pearson 
court's analysis of the jurisdictional question, upon which that holding rests, is deficient 
in numerous respects. 
Subsection (4)(e) says that "[i]f a lien claimant fails to provide the owner of the 
residence the instructions and form affidavit required by subsection 4(a), the lien 
claimant shall be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the residence." 
Reading subsections (4)(a) and (4)(e) together, the statutory scheme is straightforward: 
A lien claimant who files an action to enforce a lien is required to serve the sued 
homeowner with certain papers and if the lien claimant fails to do that, both 
maintenance and enforcement of the lien are barred. That scheme has all the hallmarks 
of a jurisdictional bar. Nonetheless, the court of appeals, applying Pearson, rejected 
the argument that (4)(a) is jurisdictional. Sill, 2005 UT App 537, 1 14. 
In Pearson, "[t]he only issue before the court [was] whether [the contractor's] 
failure to comply with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Liens Act divested the 
trial court of jurisdiction to hear [the contractor's] mechanics' lien foreclosure action." 
Pearson, 2005 UT App 383, \ 4. The Pearson court held that that failure "did not 
divest the trial court of jurisdiction" because subsection (4)(a) is not mandatory but 
merely directory, and thus is not jurisdictional. Id. at t t 12, 15. The court 
characterized subsection (4)(a)'s requirements as "'wholly informational' and but 'a 
minor component' of the Mechanics' Liens Act." Id. at \ 12 (citing Labelle v. McKay 
Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15, 1 17, 89 P.3d 113). In arriving at those 
conclusions, the Pearson court overlooked several critical points of law. 
B. In interpreting subsections (4) (a) and (e), the Pearson court 
overlooked two elementary rules of statutory construction: (1) statutes 
are to be construed according to their plain language, and (2) statutes 
must be interpreted to give meaning to all parts, so as to avoid 
rendering part of a statute superfluous. 
Well before the court of appeals decided the Pearson case, this Court had 
adopted a methodology for determining whether a statutory procedural requirement is 
jurisdictional. Whether such a requirement is jurisdictional depends on whether it is 
"mandatory" (jurisdictional) or merely "directory" (not jurisdictional). Beaver County 
v. Utah State Tax Commission, 919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996). A court is "guided in 
construing the language of [a] statute by the principle that generally a direction in a 
statute to do an act is considered 'mandatory' when consequences are attached to the 
failure to act. Conversely, when a statute requires an action to be taken without 
prescribing a penalty for failure to so act, the requirement is not often deemed 
mandatory." Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980). 
Applying those principles in examining subsections (4)(a) and (e), it is plain that 
subsection (4)(a) is a mandatory, and thus jurisdictional, provision. Those subsections 
require that a lien claimant do an act (v/z., include with service of the lien foreclosure 
complaint on the homeowner certain papers concerning the LRFA) and expressly attach 
consequences to the failure to do the prescribed act (viz., the lien claimant is barred 
from maintaining or enforcing the lien). In that sense, subsections (4)(a) and (e) are 
identical to the statutes at issue in Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) 
(construing the notice of claim provisions in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act), 
because they all contain a condition to suit which, when not satisfied, deprives the trial 
court of jurisdiction. As this Court explained in Madsen: 
Section 63-30-11 sets out the notice requirement [for filing suit against a 
governmental entity], and section 63-30-12 spells out the effect of failing 
to comply with the requirement [("A claim against the state is barred 
unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general and the agency 
concerned within one year after the cause of action arises.")]. Section 63-
30-11 provides that before a plaintiff may maintain an action against the 
State, he or she must file a notice of claim with the appropriate state 
entity. Section 63-30-12 provides that an action against the State is barred 
if the required notice is not filed. It therefore makes failure to give notice 
grounds for dismissal. A plain reading of those sections indicates that no 
suit against the State may be maintained if notice is not given. We 
therefore conclude that service of notice is a precondition to suit. 
769 P.2d at 249 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
Like the statutory notice requirement discussed in Madsen, the requirements of 
subsection (4)(a) are a condition to suit. And like the statutes in Madsen, subsection 
(4)(e) provides that a suit is "barred" if that condition is not satisfied. Thus, a lien 
claimant's failure to satisfy the statutory condition to suit contained in subsection (4)(a) 
deprives the trial court of jurisdiction. See Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 
7, 1 10, 67 P.3d 466 ("A plaintiffs failure to comply with the [Utah Governmental 
Immunity Actj's notice of claim provisions deprives the trial court of subject matter 
jurisdiction."); Madsen, 769 P.2d at 250 ("Because the plaintiffs in Madsen I did not 
give the required notice and therefore failed to satisfy a precondition to suit, the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of their claim."). Moreover, given that 
a failure to comply with subsection (4)(a) results in a bar to maintaining the lien, in 
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addition to the bar to enforcement of the lien, the lien is invalidated or extinguished by 
the failure to comply with subsection (4)(e). That is akin to the extinguishment of the 
lien this Court has held occurs after the statutory period for bringing an action to 
enforce a mechanics' lien has run, which results in a jurisdictional bar to enforcement 
of the lien. See AAA Fencing Company, 714 P.2d at 291-92. 
The Pearson court erred in concluding otherwise, and that error made its way 
into the instant case. Significantly, the Pearson court mentioned subsection (4)(e) just 
once in its opinion, in the paragraph setting forth appellant Lamb's argument on appeal. 
The court never analyzed the plain language of (4)(e), choosing instead to decide the 
issue of whether subsection (4)(a) is mandatory or merely directory by "balancing] a 
laborer's right to be paid for his labor and materials with the negative impact that liens 
have on an owner's credit and her ability to convey clear title." Pearson, 2005 UT 
App 383, f 8. The court imported that balancing analysis from Projects Unlimited, 
Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1990), where this 
Court held that a lien claimant had substantially complied with the statutory notice of 
lien requirement and thus technical errors in complying with that requirement did not 
render the mechanics' lien notice invalid. 
"Statutes are to be construed according to their plain language." LKL 
Associates, Inc. v. Farley, 2004 UT 51, ! 7, 94 P.3d 279. A court "interprets statutes 
to give meaning to all parts, and avoids rendering portions of the statute superfluous." 
Id. Indeed, the legislature's intent is derived from the plain language of a statute: 
Our court has held that when interpreting statutes, our primary goal 
is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature. The plain 
language of the statute provides us the road map to the statute's meaning, 
helping to clarify the intent and purpose behind its enactment. When 
reading the statutory language, our purpose is to render all parts of the 
statute relevant and meaningful, and thus, we presume the legislature used 
each term advisedly and according to its ordinary meaning. As a result, 
we avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous 
or inoperative. 
As is the case in construing statutes, this court's rules of practice 
and procedure require close attention to their exact language. It is an 
elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to 
every word, clause and sentence of a statute. No clause, sentence or 
word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the 
construction can be found which will give force to and preserve all the 
words of the statute. 
State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, \\ 52-53, 63 P.3d 621 (internal quotation 
marks, citations, brackets, and ellipses omitted) (emphasis added). 
In not analyzing the plain language of subsection (4)(e), the Pearson court 
overlooked the foregoing settled rules of statutory construction. Subsection (4)(e) is an 
unambiguous, express mandate from the legislature: If a lien claimant fails to comply 
with subsection (4)(a), maintenance and enforcement of the mechanics' lien are 
"barred." The Pearson court simply ignored that language. See LKL Associates, 2004 
UT 51, f 8 ("While [the owners'] argument might represent good policy, the statutory 
language clearly limits the [LRFA's] protections to either the typical single-family 
home, or a duplex. In order for this court to accept the owners' position and affirm the 
trial court, we would be forced to ignore a clear statutory mandate and render the 
definition chosen by the legislature meaningless."). 
Furthermore, in electing to apply the balancing analysis employed in Projects 
Unlimited, the Pearson court overlooked this Court's conditional language in that case, 
which prefaced its conclusion that technical errors in complying with the notice 
provision of the mechanics' lien statutes did not invalidate the notice: "[W]e have 
stated that '[a] lien once acquired by labor performed on a building with the consent of 
the owner should not . . . be defeated by technicalities, when no rights of others are 
infringed, and no express command of the statute is disregarded." Projects Unlimited, 
798 P.2d at 744 (quoting Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 249, 87 P. 713, 
716 (1906)) (emphasis added). Unlike the notice provision at issue in Projects 
Unlimited, there is an express statutory command with respect to a lien claimant's 
failure to comply with subsection (4)(a) - namely, subsection (4)(e)'s mandate that 
maintenance and enforcement of the lien are barred. The Pearson court ignored that 
command. 
C. The Pearson court overlooked the two-pronged consequence of failing 
to comply with subsection (4) (a) in concluding that that provision is 
not "mandatory55 because a dismissal of the mechanics' lien action 
could be remedied by refiling or through Utah's savings statute. 
In support of its holding that subsection (4)(a) is neither mandatory nor 
jurisdictional, the Pearson court stated that "the procedures set forth in section 38-1-
ll(4)(a) are not 'mandatory' because no consequences attach to the failure to act." 
Pearson, 2005 UT App 383 at f 9. That, of course, is not literally true, as subsection 
(4)(e) sets out the direct consequence for failing to comply with subsection (4)(a). The 
court reasoned, however, that because a dismissal of the contractor's mechanics' lien 
action could be remedied by refiling or through Utah's savings statute (UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-12-40 (2002)), there are effectively no consequences for not complying with 
subsection (4)(a), and thus that provision is neither mandatory nor jurisdictional. 
In adopting that reasoning, however, the court overlooked the two-pronged 
consequence of failing to comply with subsection (4)(a). The first and foremost 
consequence under subsection (4)(e) is that "the lien claimant shall be barred from 
maintaining * * * the lien upon the residence." As previously noted, the lien is 
therefore extinguished at the point of the lien claimaint's failure to comply with 
subsection (4)(a). Thus, contrary to what the Pearson court concluded, after the 
procedural default there is no lien upon which to refile an enforcement action. 
D. The Pearson court's reliance on Labette v. McKay Dee Hospital Center, 2004 
UT 15, 89 P.3d 113, was misplaced. 
In holding that subsection (4)(a) is not jurisdictional, the Pearson court relied 
heavily on Labelle v. McKay Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15, 89 P.3d 113. In 
Labelle, this Court held that a mailing requirement of the Medical Malpractice Act was 
not jurisdictional - a requirement the Court described as "wholly informational" and "a 
minor component of the Malpractice Act's prelitigation scheme." Labelle, 2004 UT 15 
at t 17. The Pearson court likened the requirements of subsection (4)(a) to the mailing 
requirement of the Malpractice Act, calling those requirements "'wholly informational' 
and but 'a minor component' of the Mechanics' Liens Act." Pearson, 2005 UT App 
383 at 1 12. 
The problem with comparing subsection (4)(a) to the statutory mailing 
requirement construed in Labelle is that the Malpractice Act does not contain a 
"consequence" provision like subsection (4)(e) that reveals a legislative intent to bar a 
malpractice action based on one's failure to comply with the mailing requirement. 
Indeed, this Court made that point clear at the outset of its analysis in Labelle: 
The language and structure of the Malpractice Act offer scant 
evidence of an intention to condition the exercise of the district court's 
subject matter jurisdiction on compliance with the mailing requirement. 
2004 UT 15 at if 8. Just the opposite is true with respect to subsection (4)(a), given the 
plain language of subsection (4)(e). The Pearson court overlooked that critical 
distinction between Labelle and the case before it. Even if the Pearson court 
considered the requirements of subsection (4)(a) to be a minor component of the 
mechanics' lien statutes, the legislature certainly did not think that, as evidenced by the 
serious consequences it decided to attach to the failure to comply with those 
requirements (as set forth in subsection (4)(e)). 
E. The Pearson court mistakenly concluded that prejudice was a relevant 
consideration in the determination of whether subsection (4) (a) is 
jurisdictional. 
In several parts of the Pearson court's opinion, it suggested that the homeowner 
had to show she was prejudiced by the contractor's failure to comply with subsection 
(4)(a) in order to establish that that provision is jurisdictional. See Pearson, 2005 UT 
App 383 at f 12 ("Defendant has not alleged that she was prejudiced.") & f 14 
("Furthermore, Defendant did not allege how the instructions and form affidavit 
required by section 38-1-11(a) [sic] would have conferred any demonstrable value here, 
but instead argued that such value (or lack thereof) was 'irrelevant' and 'of no 
import.'"). That suggestion is legally incorrect, as a showing of prejudice is 
unnecessary if the statute is jurisdictional. See, e.g., Lyons v. Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey, 643 N.Y.S.2d 571, 571-72 (A.D. 1996) ("The fact that the Port 
Authority may not have been prejudiced by the plaintiff's failure to comply with the 
statute is immaterial, since the requirement is jurisdictional and must be strictly 
construed."). Thus, the court mistakenly incorporated prejudice as a consideration in 
its analysis of whether subsection (4)(a) is jurisdictional. 
F. Summary 
In sum, the court of appeals' analysis of the jurisdictional question - as set out in 
Pearson and incorporated into this case - is fatally flawed. This Court therefore should 
reject that analysis and hold that subsection (4)(a) is a jurisdictional provision. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should reverse the court of appeals' 
holding that subsection (4)(a) does not create a jurisdictional bar to enforcement of a 
lien where the lien claimant fails to comply with the requirements of that provision. 
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